Animals and Women Feminist The Read online

  While only some nonhuman-animal pejoratives denigrate women, all denigrate nonhuman animals. Numerous nonhuman-animal terms act as invective solely or largely against men and boys: shark, skunk, lap dog, toad, weasel, snake, jackass, worm . The male-specific wolf and cur parallel the female-specific vixen and bitch . Cock of the walk and bullheaded correspond to mother hen and stupid cow . Dumb ox equates to dumb bunny . And old buzzard and goat resemble old biddy and crow . Nonhuman-animal terms also serve as racist epithets, as when blacks are called “ monkeys ” or “ gorillas. ” Often, invoking another animal as insult doesn ’ t target any human group: sheepish, birdbrain, crazy as a loon . In such cases the comparison ’ s fundamental speciesism stands alone. Whether or not a person is avaricious, labeling them a “ vulture ” exhibits prejudice against no group except vultures.

  Comparisons between women and domesticated animals are offensive, Baker (1975) concludes, because they “ reflect a conception of women as mindless servants ” (56). But the metaphors ’ offending components — “ mindless ” and “ servants ” — derive from speciesist attitudes and practices. Without speciesism, domesticated animals would not be regarded as mindless; without speciesism, they would not be forced into servitude. Exploiting the hen for her eggs, the cow for her milk, and the bitch for her ability to produce litters invites demeaning female-specific metaphors.

  Although some expressions that compare humans to other animals are complimentary ( busy as a bee, eagle-eyed, brave as a lion ), the vast majority offend. Anthropologist Edmund Leach (1964) categorizes “ animal ” metaphors as “ obscenity, ” along with “ dirty words ” (largely of “ sex and excretion ” ) and “ blasphemy and profanity ” (28). While Halverson (1976) rejects Leach ’ s categorization, he agrees that “ animal ” metaphors are overwhelmingly negative. What ’ s more, Halverson identifies their most universal component as “ the basic distinction human v . animal ” (515). This distinction is the essence of speciesism.

  Linguistic practice, like other human practices, is even more deeply speciesist than sexist. Humans, after all, have a verbal monopoly. Our language necessarily reflects a human-centered viewpoint more completely than a male-centered one. Considered in relation to the plight of nonhuman animals, Adrienne Rich ’ s words of feminist insight express a terrible absolute: “ this is the oppressor ’ s language ” (1971, 16, 18).

  Speciesist language has far from trivial consequences. Although nonhuman animals cannot discern the contempt in the words that disparage them, this contempt legitimates their oppression. Like sexist language, speciesist language fosters exploitation and abuse. As feminist philosopher Stephanie Ross (1981) has stated with regard to women, “ oppression does not require the awareness or co-operation of its victims ” (199).

  Every negative image of another species helps keep that species oppressed. Most such images are gross distortions. Nonhuman animals rarely possess the character traits that pejoratives assign to them. In reality the imputed traits are negative human traits. Wolves do not philander like the human “ wolf. ” Most are steadfastly monogamous (see Fox 1971, 121; Mech 1991, 89, 91). Chickens are not “ chicken. ” Throughout the centuries, observers have reported the hen ’ s fierceness in defending her chicks and the rooster ’ s courage in protecting the flock (see Robbins 1987, 49; Smith and Daniel 1975, 65 – 66, 137, 159, 162, 212, 324). (In today ’ s factory prisons, of course, chickens can no longer display their bravery.) Pigs do not “ make pigs of themselves. ” Unlike many other animals (including humans), they show no tendency to overeat (see Hedgepeth 1978, 71; Pond, Maner, and Harris 1991, 11). Pigs are not filthy. Whenever possible, they avoid fouling their living area (see Baxter 1984, 234 – 37; Hedgepeth 1978, 96). If unable to bathe in water, they will wallow in mud to cool themselves. Lacking functional sweat glands, they cannot instead “ sweat like a pig ” (see Baxter 1984, 35, 209; Hedgepeth 1978, 66). Rats 12 are not “ rats. ” While ingeniously resourceful, they do not use their quick intelligence to betray their familiars. Rat societies, in which serious fighting is an anomaly, exemplify peace and cooperation (see Barnett 1975, 262; Hart 1982, 108; Hendrickson 1983, 39, 80, 93 – 94). Moreover, rats care for the helpless in their communities, such as the orphaned young and those too old to fend for themselves (see Calhoun 1962, 257; Hendrickson 1983, 15, 80, 93 – 94). 13

  Expressions such as male chauvinist pig display the same speciesism as stupid cow . Particularly amiable and sensitive, pigs possess none of the sexist ’ s ugly character traits. Affection, cooperation, and protection of others characterize natural pig society, which is matriarchal. Boars rarely show aggression, even toward other adult males, and are especially gentle with the young. A boar mates with a sow only if she is sexually receptive — after much mutual nuzzling, rubbing, and affable grunting (see Hedgepeth 1978, 94 – 95, 137; Serpell 1986, 5 – 6). Intended to castigate men for their assumption of superiority to women, male chauvinist pig conveys the speaker ’ s own assumption of superiority, to pigs. Referring to sexism, Ross (1981) notes that “ many women adopt the very attitudes which are oppressing them ” (199). Those attitudes include speciesism.

  When a woman responds to mistreatment by protesting “ I ’ m a human being! ” or “ I want to be treated with respect, not like some animal, ” what is she suggesting about the acceptable ways of treating other animals? Perhaps because comparisons between women and nonhuman animals so often entail sexism, many women are anxious to distance themselves from other animals. Feminists, especially, recognize that negative “ animal ” imagery has advanced women ’ s oppression. However, if our treatment and view of other animals became caring, respectful, and just, nonhuman-animal metaphors would quickly lose all power to demean. Few women have confronted how closely they mirror patriarchal oppressors when they too participate in other species ’ denigration. Women who avoid acknowledging that they are animals closely resemble men who prefer to ignore that women are human.

  When used to denote other species only, animal falsely removes humans from animalkind. 17 In parallel, through their male imagery, the pseudogenerics man and mankind effectively exclude women from humankind. By reserving animal for other animals, humans deny their kinship with nonhuman animals, abjuring membership in all groups larger than species — such as primatekind, mammalkind, and animalkind (see Clark 1988). This use of animal reflects the speciesist belief that humans fundamentally differ from all nonhuman animals and are inherently superior. More subtly, man and mankind too reflect speciesism. Their power to lower women ’ s status rests on the premise that those outside our species do not merit equal consideration and respect. Linguistically ousting women from humankind has force because lack of membership in the human species condemns an individual, however thinking and feeling, to inferior status. Parakeets, bats, goldfish, mice, octopi, whales, orangutans — these and other nonhuman animals do not lack sensitivity. They do, however, lack legal rights — because they don ’ t happen to be human (see Daws 1983; Francione 1993; Galvin 1985; Midgley 1985). If the cutoff for perceived dignity and worth, and for the right to be free from exploitation and abuse, were not the border between human and nonhuman, the suggestion that women are somehow less human than men would have no political force. “ Man ’ s ” glorification is the flip side of “ animals ’ ” denigration. The sexism of man and mankind works by way of speciesism.

  Throughout our language ’ s history, men — being politically dominant — have exercised far more control than women over public discourse. Men ’ s disproportionate influence has permitted them to largely determine “ accepted ” English usage (see Bodine 1975; Spender 1985, 147 – 51). Patriarchal men would not have linguistically appropriated humanness unless it represented superiority and privilege to their speciesist minds. “ A picture of humanity as consisting of males, ” says feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye (1975), is inseparable from a “ tendency to romanticize and aggrandize the human species and to derive from one ’ s rosy picture of it a sense of one ’ s
individual specialness and superiority ” (72). Men ’ s appropriation of humanness, she proposes, “ is at bottom a version of a self-elevating identification with Humanity ” (71). 18

  Why the lies, then? Why the contempt? With contemptuous words, humans establish and maintain emotional distance from other animals. 14 This distance permits abuse without commensurate guilt. Humans blame their nonhuman victims. Physically unable to fly away, having no prior experience of predators from which to learn fear, dodos were massacred by humans, who labeled them fools. Humans load mules with heavy packs, force them to carry these loads up the most precipitous slopes in the harshest weather, and excoriate them as “ stubborn ” because they are not always eager to oblige. Having compelled captive seals to perform demeaning and unnatural acts, humans use the sneering phrase trained seal for a person who demonstrates mindless obedience. Pigs, as Leach (1964) remarks, bear an especially heavy “ load of abuse ” (50): “ we rear pigs for the sole purpose of killing and eating them, and this is rather a shameful thing, a shame which quickly attaches to the pig itself ” (51). Today most U.S. pigs experience lifelong confinement (see Baker 1993; Mason and Singer 1990, 8). 15 Ordinarily those kept until they reach slaughter weight are restricted to crowded wire cages, then crowded pens. Those kept longer, for breeding, remain confined to individual stalls so narrow that they cannot turn around (see Coats 1989, 36 – 46; Factory Farming 1987, 45 – 52; Fox 1984, 41 – 68; Johnson 1991, 34 – 35). By the time they go to slaughter, many pigs are crippled (see Coats 1989, 46; Hill 1990; Pursel et al. 1989, 1285). 16 Naturally inquisitive and sociable, with a great capacity for affection and joy, pigs suffer intensely from imprisonment. Using pig as a pejorative lends acceptability to their massive abuse.

  Linguistic markers embody “ man ’ s ” apotheosis. Frequent capitalization literally elevates Man above other animals, whose names remain lowercase. As The Oxford English Dictionary notes, singular form without a definite article further distinguishes Man from “ other generic names of animals ” (Simpson and Weiner 1989, 9:284), which are either plural or preceded by the . We say “ giraffes, oysters, and cockatoos ” or “ the giraffe, the oyster, and the cockatoo ” — not “ Giraffe, Oyster, and Cockatoo. ” Functioning as a “ quasi-proper name, ” Man personifies our species (Simpson and Weiner 1989, 9:284), endowing humans (male humans, at least) with some shared character, spiritual essence, or history of experience through which they become One. By implication there exists some ineffable, enduring quality Man-ness, but no Cat-ness, Swordfish-ness, or Monarch Butterfly-ness. Unique personification suggests that only humans transcend immediate, individual existence — that nonhuman animals never empathize with others, identify with a group, communicate experience, or remember the past and anticipate the future.

  The word human is not differentiated from other animal names by the peculiarities of form that distinguish Man . We say “ humans ” or “ the human ” just as we say “ lobsters ” or “ the lobster. ” Humans and lobsters get parallel linguistic treatment. As “ humans ” we are simply one of innumerable species. Nonspeciesist in its form, human is semantically nonsexist as well. Singled out by its form, Man divides all beings into two contrasting categories: members of our species and nonmembers. At the same time, it semantically assigns men to the first category, women to the second.

  Standard definitions of man and mankind clearly convey the sense of species superiority on which the use of these pseudogenerics relies. In the 1992 American Heritage Dictionary, the entries for man include this self-congratulatory description:

  a member of the only extant species, Homo sapiens , distinguished by a highly developed brain, the capacity for abstract reasoning, and the ability to communicate by means of organized speech and record information in a variety of symbolic systems. (1090)

  The definition exaggerates human uniqueness. Many nonhuman animals have “ a highly developed brain. ” Many have “ the capacity for abstract reasoning. ” And some have “ the ability to communicate by means of organized speech. ” In English, Alex the African gray parrot identifies and describes objects, requests toys and food, and expresses such emotions as frustration, regret, and love (see Griffin 1992, 169 – 74; Linden 1993; Pearce 1987, 273 – 75). 19 Parrots do not merely “ parrot. ” No doubt, members of numerous species would show “ organized speech ” if they possessed the necessary vocal apparatus. Instead Washoe the chimpanzee, Koko the gorilla, and other nonhuman primates have learned to communicate in American Sign Language (see Griffin 1992, 218 – 32; Kowalski 1991, 10 – 12). 20 Further, Kanzi the pygmy chimpanzee understands much spoken English and communicates by means of abstract visual symbols — demonstrating comprehension of “ a variety of symbolic systems ” (see Griffin 1992, 221 – 32; Lewin 1991; Linden 1993). Apes do not merely “ ape. ”

  Nonhuman animals like Alex, Washoe, Koko, and Kanzi have learned to use languages devised by humans. How would humans fare if expected to learn another species ’ method of communication — say, that of the bottle-nosed dolphin? Even if other species did lack the capacity for some typically human type of language and reasoning, why should this capacity be the criterion for superiority? Because it is the one that we possess? In the same self-serving and otherwise arbitrary manner, an individual might pronounce “ I have great physical strength, so physical strength signifies superiority. ”

  What if the definition of man were more truthful?

  A member of the only extant species, Homo presumptuous , distinguished by a highly developed narcissism, the capacity for routine institutionalized cruelty, and the ability to communicate endless self-justification by means of organized religion and to record prejudices as if they were fact within a variety of speciesist, sexist, and otherwise oppressive systems.

  Men would then shun man and mankind and eagerly substitute humankind — or womankind — for the species. Instead of monopolizing species membership, and its attendant glory, they would urge full (or exclusive) membership for women, who could then bear the blame.

  Having defined man as “ the men and women who uphold patriarchal values ” (19), Collard and Contrucci (1989) identify what “ man ” regards as “ his greatest glory: his passage from ape to human ” (34). Alert to the link between speciesism and sexism, these feminists reverse the standard self-aggrandizing definition of our species, exposing humans ’ negative traits, connecting our history of devastation and cruelty to those with the mentality of dominance, and saying to “ man ” : “ Now, recognize the massive destruction and suffering you have caused! ”

  Patriarchal men have depicted themselves as “ more human ” than women because they have viewed human as signifying everything superior and deserving, everything that supposedly separates humans from “ animals. ” “ Our view of man, ” philosopher Mary Midgley (1978) argues in Beast and Man, “ has been built up on a supposed contrast between man and animals ” (25). 21

  Through the false opposition human vs. animal, humans maintain a fantasy world in which chimpanzees, snails, barracudas, and tree frogs are somehow more alike than chimpanzees and humans (see Clark 1988). 22 The evolutionary bush on which humans occupy one of myriad branches is reduced to a single stalk, with nonhuman animals mired at its roots and humans blossoming at its tip. In reality, species do not evolve toward greater humanness but toward greater adaptiveness in their particular ecological niche. Nor is species something stable and fixed (see Clark 1988; Dawkins 1993). The human species, like all others, continues to undergo variation. In capacities and tendencies humans vary across a vast range (see Midgley 1978, 58), which overlaps with the ranges spanned by other species. For example, many nonhuman animals possess more rationality and altruism than many humans. Who can name a single character trait or ability shared by all humans but by no other animals?

  Human superiority is as much a lie as male superiority. Gorillas are stronger yet gentler than humans, cheetahs swifter and more graceful, dolphins more playful and exuberant. Bees who perceive ultraviolet li
ght and dance a message of angle and distance; fish who simultaneously see forward, above, below, and behind while swimming through endlessly varied tropical color; birds who navigate over hemispheres, sensing the earth ’ s magnetic field and soaring in rhythm with the rest of their flock; sea turtles who, over decades, experience vast stretches of ocean — what wisdom and vision are theirs? Other animals have other ways of knowing.

  Our individual worlds are only as wide as our empathy. Why identify with only one species when we can be so much larger? Animal encompasses human. When human society moves beyond speciesism — to membership in animalkind — “ animal ” imagery will no longer demean women or assist in their oppression, but will represent their liberation. When we finally cross the species boundary that keeps other animals oppressed, we will have crossed the boundary that circumscribes our lives.

  * * *

  Notes

  1. The relationship between speciesism and sexism is not unidirectional. Just as speciesism contributes to women ’ s oppression, sexism contributes to the oppression of nonhuman animals. For example, sexism permits concern for nonhuman animals to be dismissed as "effeminate" or as "female sentimentality." A number of feminists have detailed ways in which sexism and speciesism are mutually reinforcing (see, for example, Adams 1990, 1994; Collard with Contrucci 1989).

  2. "I believe the sexual subjugation of women, as it is practiced in all the known civilizations of the world, was modeled after the domestication of animals," writes feminist Elizabeth Fisher in Woman ’ s Creation (1979, 190). The exploitation of women for breeding and labor, she observes, followed long after enslavement of nonhuman animals (190, 197). Fisher sees an enduring "connection between dependence on animals and an inferior position for women" (194). Addressing oppression in general, social historian Keith Thomas (1983) presents strong evidence that the domestication of nonhuman animals "became the archetypal pattern for other kinds of social subordination" (46).